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ABSTRACT 
Advocates of strong artificial intelligence believe 
that properly programmed computers can go beyond the 
simulation of intelligent acts so as to instantiate and 
exhibit true intelligence, that is, intelligence equivalent 
to that of man. ln this thesis, I consider three problems 
for strong-A!. 
First, John Searle's well-known thought experiment of 
the "Chinese Room" is used to reestablish the syntax-
semantics distinction and to show how this distinction 
applies to computer programs. I review the Chinese Room, 
consider a variety of objections to it, and then expand on 
the key points in Searle's work. 
Second, 1 examine the Frame Problem in artificial 
intelligence, a question made popular by Daniel Dennett. 
Rational agents have the ability to adjust their conceptual 
schemes and update their noetic web of beliefs so as to 
maintain a representation of the world. This ability is 
easily observed but not well understood. I argue that 
computers lack this abil~ty altogether. The Frame Problem 
examines this deficiency and programming techniques designed 
to overcome it. 
Third, the Overseer problem examines the need for 
artificial systems to have a rational agent in place who 
designates a given task and determines when that task is 
successfully completed by the system. I argue that as long 
as this need exists, artificial systems cannot be considered 
intelligent in an unequivocal sense. 
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INTRODUCTION 
We are about to conceive of the hr1owet- as a comput.it19 machine. 
Wan-en S. McCulloch, M.D. 
"Tt-,r-ough the Den of the Meta.physician_.'' 1'i54 
I am pt-epan:::d to go so fat- as to sa.y that within a. few yeat-s, lt thet-e r-emc:tin 
ai·V philosopher-s who at-e not familiat- with some of the ma.it1 developments it1 
art.ific:la.l. intelligence, it ·,·ill be fait- to a.ccu.se them c•f pt-ofessk•nal 
inc()mpetet1Ce1 B.tid tt"ld.t. t.o t.ea.ch cour-ses in philosophy of mit1d, episte-
mology .•• without discussing .•• aspects of artificia.l int.elligence will be as 
it-r-esponsible .;as givit19 a cow-se in physics which includes no quantum them-y. 
Aan:w·1 Sloma.n 
The Computet- Revolution iti Philosophy, 1978 
Often in the history of philosophy, philosophers have 
had to field concerns, questions, and claims from other 
disciplines. This is such a time. Artificial intelligence, 
once an obscure corner of computer science, raises questions 
and makes claims that traditionally belong to the 
epistemologist and metaphysician, to the philosopher of 
language and mind, as well as the psychologist and neuro-
physiologist. In this work, I will examine some of the 
philosophical concerns surrounding these claims. 
I. The Problem 
Let's start to outline the field of interest with some 
terms. The first is "strong artificial intelligence." This 
term names the position that, as Michael Arbib says, "AI 
programs really could exhibit understanding or intelligence, 
rather than simply simulate aspects of behaviors we construe 
as intelligent when performed by a human being" (emphasis 
mine). 1 "Weak AI" is similar to the former view although 
weak AI is limited to simulation and makes no claims about 
true machine intelligence. I will use "Aiers" to designate 
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supporters of strong-A!. "AI" itself is an elusive term to 
define, but here are a couple of attempts by those in the 
field: 
AI is that pert of computet- science concen1ed with designing 
it1telligent. computet- systems, i.e. systems that. e::-:hbit the 
charact.et-istks which we a.ssc•ciate with intelliqence in human 
behe.viour---e.g. utiderst.ar;ding language, lean1ing_, t-easc•r1ing_, 
solvin·3 pr-oblems et.c.2 
(A system is artificially intelligent] if the +...asf~ [the system] 
is ce.t-r-yiti9 out would r-equit-e intelligence if pet-for-med by 
hu.mans.3 
Why is it that AI has been such a hot topic philo-
sophically? One reason is that philosophers perceive a major 
misunderstanding of computer science claims at the popular 
level. This often happens when technical terms--in any 
field, not just computer science--are imported back into 
popular writing. Another reason lies in the sometimes 
outlandish claims of Aiers that reach far beyond their field. 
Consider for example this scenario envisioned by Carnegie-
Mellon researcher Hans Moravec. One day all knowledge and 
skills will be stored in computers and "down-loaded" to 
people whenever they require such expertise. 
This will r-esult in a gt-adua.l 1?n:•sim1 of itidividue.lity_, at1d 
fot-matiot1 of an incredibly potent community. • • • [Which '#ill 
be] constar1t.l)l impt-ovit-:g BY1d e::-::tending itself, spn=::ading 
outwan:!s ft-om the solar- system, cm1verting t1on-life it1to 
mind. . . • This pr-ocess_, possibly occu.t-r-ing now elsewher-e_, 
might convet-t the entir-e univer-se into an e::-::t.ended thinking 
et1t.ity.4 
If a philosopher or theologian made such claims, he would not 
be taken very seriously. 
Let's examine strong-A! more closely. "Intelligent 
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behavior" is picked out, somewhat intuitively, and identified 
with those acts carried out by humans that artifacts 
(normally) cannot carry out.~ Computers can be made to act 
intelligently via rule-governed symbol manipulation (i.e., 
they are programmed). The digital computer is a systematic 
symbol shuffler. That is, at one level of computational 
description, l's and O's are moved to the right place at the 
right time according to the hardware restraints and the 
software instruction. At a deeper level, transistors are 
systematically turned on and off, The program determines the 
rules by which these manipulations will occur. According to 
this "rules-and-representations" view CRR), humans also must 
or might (there is a spectrum of opinion here) produce 
intelligent behavior through an internal set of rules. 
Supporters of RR point to logic and language as paradigm 
cases of rule governedness that would require such mental 
symbols. Both humans and computers would, therefore, 
comprise a larger class of "information processing systems." 
Although the RR view does not apply to all branches of 
computer science, it has dominated the AI community for the 
past twenty years. Strong AI working under the RR model is 
now called classic or "good-old-fashioned-A!" (GOFAI, coined 
by John Haugeland). 
Traditionally optimism runs high in GOFAI. Herbert 
Simon of Carnegie-Mellon University claims that literally 
thinking machines now exist. In fact, these machines have 
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thoughts in the strictest sense of the term.• Alan Newell, 
Simon's long-time associate, claims that intelligence just ~ 
physical symbol manipulation. If machines manipulate the 
symbols in the "right way," the machines should embody 
intelligence in precisely the same sense as humans. 7 
paper by both Simon and Newell they write, 
Then? at-e tiOW in the wm-ld machines that think, that. learn and 
tha.t. ct-eate. Mm-eover-, their- ability to do these things is 
going to inct-ease t-apidly Ut1til--it1 the visible futut-e--the 
nmge of pn:•blems they can handle will be cc•e>=:tensi ve with the 
r-atige to which the human mind has beet1 a.pplied.6 
In a 
Marvin Minsky of MIT, perhaps the most important thinker in 
AI, thinks that humans might be reduced to household pets by 
the next generation of computers. 9 Finally, John McCarthy, 
inventor of the term "artificial intelligence," says the 
"ascription of mental qualities is most straightforward for 
machines of known structure such as thermostats and computer 
operating systems. II l. (:) For example, your furnace 
thermostat has at least three beliefs: it' s too hot, it' s 
too cold, it's just right. These are a few of the more 
celebrated opinions found in GOFAI circles. 
II. General Outline 
The subject matter discussed so far is both broad and 
deep enough to take in many directions. I will focus on 
three, one per chapter. 
Chapter 1 will deal with the syntax-semantics 
distinction--actually the failure to maintain this 
distinction. AI critics argue that at the core of any 
digital computer system is a network of switches. 
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The on-off 
manipulations (even the l's and O's in the machine code) are 
purely syntactic: tokens are shuffled around in a rule-
governed way. Aiers counter that at the system level (i.e, 
the system-as-a-whole), complex rule-governed behavior allows 
for the emergence of semantic content: the tokens will have 
meaning. John Searle's "Chinese Room" thought-experiment 
will serve as the pivotal example through which to address 
this problem. I will argue, in agreement with Searle, that 
syntax is never sufficient for semantics, although the 
Chinese Room example is not without its shortcomings. 
Chapter 2 will focus on what some believe to be an 
insurmountable epistemic problem for the RR view, viz., the 
Frame Problem. In short, the frame problem is the computer's 
inability to abstract (what we consider to be) important 
details from common experience and to then use this 
information to guide its future behavior. I will argue that 
the frame problem is not another technical difficulty to be 
overcome in time, but rather that the classic RR model is 
inadequate to handle this difficulty. AI is quite possibly 
in the midst of a paradigm shift because of the chronic 
failure to overcome this problem and because of the early 
successes of a rival model. 
As Thomas Kuhn has shown, to have a paradigm shift, 
there must be a rival paradigm. In Chapter 3 I will briefly 
present some key aspects of the rival "connectionist" 
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approach. The main topic of the chapter is to present yet 
another difficulty, what I will call the Overseer Problem, 
that affects not only GOFAI computers, but the new 
connectionist systems as well. 
III. An Important Qualification 
Equivocating over technical-operational and popular 
terms has a long and glorious history in AI. Some in the 
artificial intelligentsia purposefully deny that there is any 
equivocation. McCarthy provides a key example: 
To asct-ibe cer-tain "beliefs", "hnowledge", "ft-ee:~ will", 
"ititentions", "consciousness", "abilities" or "wa.nt.s" to 
a ma.chit·te m- computet- pn:•gt-am is legj.timat.e when such art 
aschption e::<pt-esses the sa.me infon11at.ion atu:.ut. the machit1e 
that it e::·q:•n'?sses a.bout. a pet-son.11 
Here i~ a clear case where the metaphorical use of 
anthropomorphic terms has ceased to be metaphorical. I see 
nothing wrong with using mental terms to describe the 
behavior and function of various computer operations; 
however, we must realize that such ascriptions are (usually) 
intended as analogies only. For example, one might describe 
a chess-playing computer as believing that its king is in 
trouble. In fact, the computer "believes" nothing nor does 
it have any conception of "king" or "chess" for that matter. 
The computer is simply executing the commands it has been 
programmed to carry out. Mental terms used in this analogous 
way are (or at least were) useful shorthands in denoting a 
given behavior. 
In Section I of his paper "Artificial Intelligence 
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Meets Natural Stupidity," Drew McDermott explains that 
programmers sometimes become entranced by their own "wishful 
mnemonics. " 1 :;;~. McDermott shows how a suggestive subroutine 
like UNDERSTAND, GOAL, or ASSERT might get its name before 
the programmer knows if his algorithm has any chance of 
simulating what's being named. 
If [the pt-ogr-ammer-J calls the ma.in loop of his pt-ogt-am 
'UNDERSTAND'_, he is (until pr-oven innocent) met-ely begging the 
quest.i•:.r·i. He may mislea.d .:;; lot of peQple, most. pn:.minent.ly 
himself_, and et1t-age a. lot of othet-s. What he should do it1st.ee.d 
is t-efer- to this ma.in loop as '!3003!t' and see if he can 
•;;:ptwince himself ot- anyone else that !30034 implements some 
par-t of under-st.::.tiding.13 
Such oversights ultimately hurt the AI field. Slogans 
and buzz words, especially when used outside of a technical 
context, have come to confuse more than clarify. 
With this danger plainly in view, such metaphorical 
terms still have heuristic value. As long as the metaphor is 
clearly noted, using "learns," "sees," etc., to describe 
computer behavior ~ a useful shorthand. Thus the reader is 
warned up front that my use of anthropomorphic terms in this 
manner in _no way endorses a reduction of any kind. With this 
qualification firmly established, let's enter the Chinese 
Room. 
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Koperski 9 
CHAPTER 1 
SYNTAX, SEMANTICS, AND SEARLE 
For- Seade .• ititentiOt"!ality is t-athet- m~.e a WC•ndet-ful substance sect-et.ed by the 
bt-ain the way the pancr-eas seo-etes insulin. Bt-aitis pt-oduce intentionality. he 
sa.ys, whet-eas othet- objects, such a.s •:c•mputet- pt-ogt-ams, cko n:•t. . • , Luddly 
fm- us ••• out- bt-aitlS maJ.;e intentionality; if they didn~t we'd behave .just as 
we now do, but of cout-se we wouldn't mean it! 
Datliel Dennett 
"The Milk of Human It1tentim1ali ty ," 1'780 
Thet-e is a tendency in AI today t.c•wat-ds flashy, splashy doma.ins. • • • Yet 
ther-e is tlo pt-ogt-am that has common sense; no pr-ogro:tm that lean1s things that 
it has tlot been e::·::plicitly been taught how to lean1 ••.. 
Dou·3las H:•fstadtet-
"At-t.ificia.l It-,telligence: Subcogtlition as Computa.tion," 1'783 
In the twentieth century, the philosophy of language 
has become a hotly contested sub-discipline. Regardless of 
one's position, all agree that many helpful distinctions have 
been made. The distinction I will focus on in this chapter 
causes little controversy until computer intelligence comes 
into play. This is the distinction between syntax and 
semantics. 
Syntax is the realm of symbols (tokens) and their 
proper manipulation. 1 Syntactic rules tell us "what counts": 
which tokens are allowed and in what order they are to be 
recognized. For example, among the specified tokens in 
arithmetic we have '1', '2', '3', '+', and '=' In first 
grade we learn that '2 + 1 = 3' is an allowable string of 
arithmetic tokens whereas '2 1 + = 3' is not. The symbols 
are arbitrary, of course, e.g., we know that '1 + 8 = 9' is 
the same as 'I + VIII = IX' in Roman numerals. But what do 
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we mean by "is the same as?" 
To answer this question, we enter the realm of 
semantics. The Arabic and Roman numerals are the same in the 
sense that we assign the same semantic content to '8', 
'VIII', and 'eight'. Tokens themselves lack. semantic 
content; they are meaningless. Tokens only have meaning when 
they are interpreted. 
Computers are syntactic engines. In the introduction, 
we saw that they manipulate symbols according to the rules of 
a given program. Aiers (recall this designates strong-A!, RR 
enthusiasts) claim that syntactic rules can be of sufficient 
complexity when embodied in a computer program so that a 
computer can go beyond simple syntax and actually understand 
the commands being executed. That is, given a sufficiently 
rich syntactic program code, the computer will provide 
semantic content to its symbols. Under the RR model of 
cognition, we do much the same thing--people have an internal 
syntax that produces our semantics. 
John Searle's main criticism of this view is simple: 
Thet-e is a. distinction between manipulatit19 the syntactical 
elemer:ts of la.nguage and actually under-standing the language 
at a. semantic level. What is k•st in the AI simulation of 
cc•gnitive behaviour- is the distinction between syr:ta::< and 
semantics.2 
Searle's thought-experiment illustrates that manipulating 
symbols according to a list of rules will never produce 
understanding in the mechanism--biological or mechanical--
executing the rules. In short, syntax is never sufficient 
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for semantics. 
I. Searle's Chinese Room: The Argument 
The experiment runs as follows CI will put myself in 
Searle's role). 3 Imagine I am in a small room with baskets 
full of Chinese language characters. It is important to note 
that I do not understand Chinese in the least--the characters 
are just different tokens to me. I have been provided with a 
rule book, written in English (which I obviously understand), 
with instructions for matching these symbols with other 
symbols. I use the term 'symbol' here under the assumption 
that these tokens symbolize something to someone. The rules 
in the book govern the manipulation of the symbols by their 
shape alone; no translations or meanings are provided. 
Outside the room, native Chinese people have access to two 
slots, In and Out, and have no idea what's going on inside. 
They slip pieces of paper with Chinese characters through the 
In slot and I match these symbols with those specified by the 
rule book. The book instructs which symbols to then pick out 
of the baskets and send through the Out slot. 
Unbeknownst to me, the people outside are putting 
questions, not just random symbols, in the In slot and, from 
their point of view, answers to these questions are coming 
through the Out slot. This exchange is exactly what the 
writers of the rule book intended. These "answers" to 
"questions" are in perfect Chinese syntax and obey standard 
Chinese semantic rules. As far as the Chinese are concerned, 
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whoever is in the room seems to understand their language. 
But I do not understand Chinese. 
The analogy to a digital computer lines up this way. 
The rule book. corresponds to a computer program written in 
whatever artificial language you lik.e (e.g., LISP, the 
traditional language for AI). The rule book. writers are the 
programmers, the only one's who k.now what's going on inside 
and outside the room. The baskets of symbols are a data 
base. I am the computer, or perhaps specifically the CPU. 
The In slot serves as an input terminal and the Out slot is a 
printer. 
The thrust of the argument is really quite simple: 
If I do tiot undet-st.and Chinese solely on the basis c•f n_tnt1iti9 a 
computet- pn)gt-a.m fot- undet-st.an•jing Chinese .• then r,eithet- does 
any othet- digita.l computet- solely on that basis. Digital 
computet-s met-ely ma.nipulate for-mal symbols acc.:.njing to t-u.les 
in the pn:.gt-a.m.4 
We may break. the argument down this way: 
a is able to execute a list of rules that simulates the 
understanding of language L to some observer a. 
a does not understand L. 
Therefore the execution of a list of rules is not 
sufficient for a to understand L. 
II. The Chinese Room: Application 
The thought-experiment is intriguing and for the most 
part uncontroversial as it stands. Of course, Searle uses 
the Chinese Room as a launching pad for a more elaborate 
argument consisting specifically of four premises (P) and 
four conclusions (C).~ 
CPl) Brains cause minds. This premise is unnecessary 
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and serves primarily to affirm Searle's physicalism. The 
mind is viewed here as a higher order property of the brain 
(higher, that is, than say its greyness or solidity). Searle 
might agree with Minsky's belief that "minds are what brains 
do"; however, Searle strives to preserve the concept of mind 
from hasty reductions, especially those of the eliminative 
materialist.• Except for this premise, as Sir John Eccles 
points out, Searle's argument could easily come from a 
dualist in the philosophy of mind. 7 
CP2) Syntax is not sufficient for semantics. Of 
course, strong-A! calls this begging the question. The RR 
model claims precisely that semantics will be found to be a 
property of a sufficiently rich syntax. The Chinese Room is 
meant to emphasize (and perhaps reestablish) P2. 
CP3) Computer programs are purely formal (syntactic). 
There is no fundamental reason for programs to be run only on 
digital computers since the program itself only specifies 
syntactic manipulations. The symbols at the machine code 
level Cl's and O's, on and off) are wholly abstract and can 
be assigned to any rule-governed system: water pipes, 
control relays, or, according to Searle, "old beer cans 
strung together with wires and powered by windmills.'' Keep 
P3 in mind; it will become important later on. 
CP4) tlinds have mental contents; specifically, they 
have semantic contents. This premise Searle takes as self-
evident and all of cognitive science assumes it. The cause, 
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not the fact, of semantic content is controversial. Searle 
now moves to his conclusions. 
(Cl) No computer program by itself is sufficient to 
give a system a mind. Programs, in short, are not minds and 
they are not by themselves sufficient for causing minds. The 
only things we know that cause minds, at this point, are 
brains. Some mental activities (e.g., logic) can obviously 
be simulated by computers, so in a (trivial?) sense minds can 
be described computationally. However, simulated "thinking" 
via computational symbol manipulation does not imply that 
thinking is identical to symbol manipulation. 
(C2) The way that brain functions cause minds cannot be 
solely in virtue of running a computer program (Pl + Cl). 
This strikes at heart of the RR model. No matter what kind 
of internal syntax the RR might claim we have, it will never 
be rich enough to explain our semantic behavior. 
(C3) Anything else that caused minds would have to have 
causal powers at least equivalent to those of the brain. The 
opacity of the term 'causal powers' will attract critics en 
masse. This problem will be examined in the next section. 
(C4) For any artifact that we might build that had 
mental states equivalent to human mental states, the 
implementation of a computer program would not by itself be 
sufficient for those mental states. Searle does not deny the 
possibility of synthetic intelligence, just that such 
intelligence will not simply implement a formal program. Why 
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not? Because any formal rules put into the system could, in 
principle, be followed by a human without understanding what 
the program is about. C4 is perhaps simply a corollary of 
Cl. 
III. Facing the Critics 
In the last ten years, Searle has become one of the 
most 
prominent philosopher-critics of GOFAI. Not surprisingly, 
the Chinese Room has drawn fire from all corners of cognitive 
science. In this section, I will examine some of these 
criticisms and offer possible replies. I assume that Searle 
would agree with these replies to his critics, since some of 
these he offers himself, but I cannot guarantee this across 
the board. 
A. "Causal Powers" [C3]: What does this mean? Many 
critics wonder aloud what these causal powers might be. 
Searle leaves his explanation at a rather intuitive level 
saying only that physical systems do not exhibit 
intentionality--at least not yet. However, as a physicalist, 
Searle cannot call on a mind or soul to serve as the 
metaphysical seat of either agent causality or intentions. 
Other physicalists want a material analysis of these causal 
powers, and rightly so. 
Reply. Whatever they are, the brain's causal powers 
are more than just the ability to execute the next rule in a 
syntactic code, which is all the symbols in a program can do. 
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Without question, we do need science to help uncover the 
nature of these causal powers of the brain, but the causal 
powers of l's and O's are already well understood: they are 
abstract symbol carriers only. Furthermore, whether a 
machine has these causal powers is an empirical question. 
How so? Recall Searle has no theoretical objections to the 
possibility of synthetic intelligence (see C4), thus machines 
with causal powers might be invented someday.e The point is, 
instantiating a program is not sufficient to provide such 
machines with causal powers. It is this syntactic insuf-
ficiency that the Chinese Room is directed against, not the 
possibility of man-made intelligence. 
I agree with Searle's critics that "causal power" is a 
very opaque term that invites abuse. If such powers are 
empirically testable, as Searle claims, it would help if he 
provided at least an outline for the criteria we might employ 
to find them. Without any empirical guidelines, such causal 
powers remain quite mysterious and out of place for a 
physicalist. In fact, intentionality and agent causation are 
traditionally called on by dualists to criticize reductive 
theories in the philosophy of mind. Critics rightly sense 
that these elements are difficult to mak.e coherent in a 
physicalist system. 
B. Counterexample: Haugeland's Demon CH-demon).~ In 
trying to nail down Searle's application of causal powers, 
John Haugeland has proposed this counterexample. Consider 
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person a who has been struck with a rare disease such that 
his brain's neurotransmitters no longer send signals from 
neuron to neuron. We install in a's brain an H-demon that 
"tickles the appropriate synapse of the next neuron in a way 
that is functionally indistinguishable, to that neuron, from 
the arrival of genuine neurotransmitters.'' 10 The demon is so 
quick that it never falls behind and a's brain continues to 
function. The question for Searle is, does this brain still 
have intentionality (and therefore causal powers)? 
Reply. Searle does not back down: "[a's) neurons 
still have the right causal powers; they just need help from 
the demon.'' 11 That is, if the H-demon can reproduce the 
activity within the brain as if it were working properly, 
then yes, the causal powers are maintained and so is inten-
tionality. 
Searle's critics do not like this reply since it only 
slightly firms up the notion of causal powers. The empirical 
criterion asked for seems to be simply "x has causal powers 
iff x is a working brain." I believe, however, that Searle's 
reply is consistent with his main point against GOFAI. Note 
that the H-demon does not follow a set of rules (e.g., a 
computer program) to keep a's brain going. This new demon-
brain system might be semi-artificial or synthetic (thus 
possibly intentional, see last reply), but as long as the 
demon-brain operates by a means other than rule execution, 
the H-demon is not an example of strong-A!. Therefore this 
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is not a counterexample to the Chinese Room. 
C. The Systems Reply. This criticism comes from both 
computer and neuro-science. In short it says, "You do not 
understand Chinese, but the room as a whole does." The 
Chinese Room is not complete if we just focus on me, the guy 
inside. The room is also data banks of symbols plus the rule 
book. plus scratch pads. 
the system, not just me. 
Understanding is ascribed to 
As Haugeland puts it, "the system 
as a whole manipulates the tokens in ways appropriate to what 
they mean, with no intervention from outside users; and 
that's semantic activity." 1 :d!. Searle confuses different 
levels of description and attribution. According to Daniel 
Dennett, for example, "l understand English; [my] brain 
doesn't. " 1·::!!' No one wants to ascribe understanding to 
the computer's CPU. Searle is simply looking too deep. If 
the system exhibits semantic activity, then at the system 
level we can ascribe understanding to it. 
Reply. System level ascription does not escape the 
syntactic-semantic distinction: "[If] I, as the central 
processing unit, have no way of figuring out what any of 
these symbols mean; [then] neither does the whole 
system." 1· 4 That is, if I don't understand the Chinese 
symbols, then no matter how many useful things you throw in 
with me, the room doesn't understand either. 
Consider a counterexample, suggested by Searle. I 
memorize the rule book. and the symbols in the baskets. The 
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system is no more; there's just roe. I can now apparently 
read and write Chinese, but the question is whether I 
understand Chinese the same way I understand English. 
Clearly I do not. I am following the rules I have memorized 
for dealing with Chinese characters, but I still don't know 
what they mean, "Whereas the English subsystem knows that 
'hamburger' refers to hamburgers, the Chinese subsystem knows 
only that 'squiggle squiggle' is followed by 'squoggle 
squoggle • . "H.• The key difference again rests on what I, as a 
knowing subject, self-reflectively understand or do not 
understand. No outside observer can unerringly make this 
judgment. 
D. Faulty Model of the Mind-Brain. Although this 
criticism has many versions, I will focus on Marvin Minsky's: 
I dm1't mea.n to sa.y that bt-ains or minds are simple; bt-a.it1S at-e 
immensely comple::< machines--at1d so at-e wha.t. they do ••• 
Whenevet- we speaJ.; a.bout. a mitid, we't-e n::ferdng to the 
pt-ocesses that. move out- bt-a.itis ft-om st.ate to state.1'-" 
Minsky's point is closely related to the usual criticisms 
about folk psychology. That is, most or all of the events 
named by prescientific mental terms, including Searle's 
"intentionality" and "causal powers," are simply the result 
of a highly complex, physical process. Eventually these 
prescientific terms will be reduced or replaced by a mature 
mind science. Searle's analysis forces us to give credence 
to opaque terms derived from our own limited introspection. 
Before we say what computers can or cannot understand, let's 
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first allow neuroscience and AI to run their course so we 
really know what's going on. 
Reply. Searle's reply continues on the same theme. A 
fully mature neurophysiology with precise scientific jargon 
will not erase the difference between a belief ascribed to an 
artifact and a belief had by a person. 17 For the sake of 
scientific research, one can certainly put humans, computers, 
and thermostats on a relative "belief continuum." But the 
point Searle comes back. to again and again is that our 
ascriptions cannot change the real, first-person, qualitative 
difference between a machine's behavior and our experience. 
The gulf between my knowing Chinese and behaving as if I know 
Chinese cannot be bridged by a new scientific description of 
the process. 
E. Misleading Analogy. The Chinese Room gives the 
impression that the subject is doing the equivalent of 
manipulating an AI program by hand. 16 The reader is led to 
identify with Searle's "feeling the lack of understanding 
Chinese." But human execution of a complex language program 
made for a digital computer would take years! Searle doesn't 
mention this and for good reason. If the question-and-answer 
transaction with the Chinese people outside the room took 
years, the questioners would no longer believe anyone in the 
room understood Chinese. Once this time factor is revealed, 
Searle's intuitive link with the reader fails and so does the 
thought-experiment. 
Reply. 
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The responses to this problem are concise and 
compelling. First, we could replace the man in the room with 
Haugeland's H-demon, which is very fast. Hand manipulating 
the program now is on par with a computer. But when we ask 
the (English speaking) H-demon if he understands Chinese, we 
get the same result as before. Second, when did speed become 
a criterion for intelligence? How fast someone solves a 
problem or thinks about a question might be a measure of his 
intelligence, but time is not a factor in determining whether 
a subject is intelligent. Bringing in a speed element is ad 
hoc. 
F. Intuition pump. 19 For those already sympathetic to 
the strong-A! side, this is possibly the most damaging 
criticism. Unfortunately for Searle, his entire "argument" 
is nothing but an intuition pump. He doesn't really assert 
anything, but Searle gets the reader to nod his head in 
agreement and say to h imse 1 f, "Yea, he's right. I would 
surely know whether I understood Chinese are not." According 
to Ned Block, Searle has a hidden premise: "Evidence isn't 
suff ic lent to overrule the 1 ntu1 t ions. " 2 '::> After a 11, our 
intuitions once told us Earth is stationary, large objects 
fall faster than small, etc. When evidence is introduced, 
our intuitions must conform. Searle is unfair in two ways. 
First, he acts like evidence is at the mercy of intuition. 
Second, he does not deal with any of the evidence for the AI 
side. Such hand-waving over the successes of the field 
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should not be tolerated. 
Reply. 'Intuition' is used here in an equivocal way. 
On one hand, one's intuitions (i.e., thoughts or opinions) 
about the goings on in the Chinese Room are irrelevant. The 
point of the illustration is to emphasize a conceptual truth 
that is usually well understood: syntax is not semantics. 
The Chinese Room attempts to recapture the idea that 
shuffling uninterpreted formal symbols is not the same as 
understanding their meaning. On the other hand, 'intuition' 
has an epistemic sense regarding one's first-person 
experience of a situation. I know intuitively (i.e., 
directly and with certainty) that I don't understand Chinese. 
This use is different from the popular use of 'intuitive 
insight' as in "women's intuition." The second use of 
'intuition' is what Searle appeals to in most of his replies. 
No third-person observer can have a subject's direct, first-
person intuition that the subject does or does not understand 
a given symbol. 
In conclusion, Searle's critics often try to take the 
Chinese Room beyond the very limited scope intended. In 
almost every case, the reply refocuses the discussion on the 
key issues of syntax-semantics and first-person understanding 
(or lack of understanding). These are the conceptual pillars 
Searle is trying to save from a behavioral reduction. 
IV. Beyond the Chinese Room 
Why is it that the Chinese Room invokes so much 
Koperski 23 
criticism? Most Aiers point to the intuition pump. The 
computer science successes brought about by the RR model are 
thought to be a decisive blow against anyone (especially 
bothersome philosophers) who relies solely on non-empirical 
arguments. Although complete brain simulation might be a 
technological impossibility, under the RR theory there is no 
physical impossibility preventing the brain's rule-governed 
activity from being captured by a program. If we could only 
discover the correct rules and if we had a medium of 
sufficient complexity, Aiers claim, we would have 
unequivocal, non-metaphorical, artificial intelligence. 
In this section, I will present an adaptation of the 
Chinese Room to try to determine where the line is drawn on 
the application of the RR model (i.e., what is it that we may 
call intelligent?). RR enthusiasts will likely object that 
my application is not what they intended their criteria to be 
used for; however, the thought-experiment is a well 
established device to determine where a theory might lead. 
A. Another Thought Experiment. As I was studying one 
morning, a small robot crawled into my room, handed me a 
book, and promptly disappeared. The book (copyright 2025) 
contained the history of AI research. In the year 2020, 
engineers at IBM-Xerox, Inc. invented (i.e., will invent) the 
UBS (Ultimate Brain Simulation) program. UBS was run on a 
highly advanced optic-digital computer, the CRAY-7. With 
speed and memory many orders of magnitude higher than in 
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previous decades, UBS on the CRAY-7 can produce any semantic 
behavior desired. According to the now mature RR model of 
cognition, the CRAY-7 instantiates true intelligence. 
In 2021, Ed, an electrical engineer who dabbled in 
necromancy, got a copy of UBS but decided not to run it on 
the CRAY-7. A formal program, after all, has no intrinsic 
preference for what physical apparatus carries it out. 
In Ed's wizardly experiments, he learned to conjure up 
a small demon (much like the H-demon described earlier). 
This H-demon is not only quick but transdimensional, 
"blinking" in and out of any location instantaneously. Ed 
teaches the H-demon to leave flashlights at every planet and 
moon in the galaxy. 
scale. 
Ed decides to run UBS on a galactic 
Impossible? As I mentioned in the introduction, at a 
deep level of description a digital computer is a system of 
electronic switches that are either on or off, depending on 
the program instruction. Theoretically, any medium that can 
keep track of two physical states (on and off) can carry out 
a program. 
Ed teaches the demon to read the UBS code and switch 
the flashlights on-off as the code instructs. 21 The demon 
periodically checks with Ed for any new commands 
("interrupts" in computer jargon). 
Now if running UBS instantiates true human-level 
intelligence, should we expect the CRAY-7, and now the galaxy 
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itself, to have beliefs, perhaps an idea of "self," and even 
free will? What criteria would we apply? The philo-
sophically interesting question the galactic brain experiment 
points to is, If intelligence is a property, I, what are we 
to count as candidates for intelligence, x? Since persons 
(a) are intelligent--the paradigm case if you will--certainly 
the variable x can be replaced with the name of any person, 
Ia (read "a is intelligent"). Aiers also want to substitute 
certain computers (c) that meet the RR criteria for 
intelligence, Ic. Now we have another medium that meets the 
RR criteria; but does anyone want to count the galaxy (g) as 
a candidate for intelligence, Ig? What criterion in the RR 
model allows Ia and Ic but disallows Ig? There are none. 
B. Trying to Fix RR. There are two possible criteria 
to 
limit the domain of x. First, Aiers could argue the galactic 
brain is too slow: Ix only if x is fast. This rule is 
derived from the fact that semantic behavior is not 
observable from a system that takes months or years to reply 
to an inquiry. The problem with this criterion is that the 
RR model does not consider speed. Adding a time qualifier is 
clearly an ad hoc fix, but let's allow it for now. 
The galactic brain could still meet the new criteria. 
Instead of one H-demon blinking around space, Ed conjures up 
trillions of H-demons. Better still, Ed discovers that 
demons have trans-dimensional sight. He puts one H-demon per 
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flashlight so each demon can read the program code on Earth 
and also see the other lights going on/off, Speed would then 
approach the new requirements. 
The second new criterion possible is spatial 
localization: Ix only if x is spatially localized. g is 
undeniably non-local, but this fix fails as well. What is 
the standard for localization? On a human scale, g is not 
localized; on a universal scale, g is very localized (i.e., g 
is not undeniably non-local). Like the speed objection, this 
one is another ad hoc fix. I cannot alter the galactic brain 
to fit this time, but such subjective standards tend to 
weaken the strong-A! case. 
I believe the "what counts" problem for the object of 
predicate I runs throughout the Chinese Room debate. 
Consider three levels of use for mental terms, including 
intelligence. Level one (Ll) is the neural level. Many 
believe Ll is where we find the sufficient conditions for 
semantic behavior. Neuro-science focuses here. L2 is the 
personal level: the common use of mental terms has to do 
with people, not neural interactions. Psychology focuses on 
L2 while AI picks and chooses between Ll and L2. There is 
also an L3 at the level of corporate objects like nations and 
companies. We say things like "General Motors loves its 
customers" and "the United States wants all foreign 
governments. II 
Pure reductionists want to dispel with L2 and L3. 
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Prereflectively, everyone agrees that attributing mental 
properties or actions to corporate objects is highly 
metaphorical. Reductionists go further to say mentalistic 
terms used in folk. psychology are lik.ewise non-technical and 
confusing and will eventually be replaced by scientific terms 
(see Minsk.y above). We should disregard the upper levels of 
mental description in favor of what's "really" going on: 
neural interaction. 
The more common view is to agree with the reductionist 
about corporate objects, but reject the wholesale reduction 
of L2 to Ll. Mental terms lik.e 'belief' and 'intention' are 
not sufficiently captured or explained by neural phenomena. 
This is the position of Searle and substance dualists.zz 
C. Operationalism. There is a shadowy middle ground 
between reductionism. and folk. psychology that sometimes goes 
unrecognized in the AI debate. This territory is held by 
operationalismJ an approach to the philosophies of mind and 
science that will become very important in chapter 3. The 
operationalists hold that L2 terms (beliefs, desires, etc.) 
are useful and should not be reduced to Ll terms. This 
differs with Searle and the dualists in that, although 
useful, L2 terms for the operationalist have no more 
ontological weight than L3, the corporate-mental terms. 
Here is an example by Dennett. Consider terms used by 
loggers in Maine: 
You ca.n ft.t-id\' an a.pple t.t-ee uTr.:.o fthinf\ing it's spr-ing' by 
building a small fit-e Ut1det- its br-anches in the late fall:; it will 
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blossc•tT;. This way of talking is nc•t .just picturesque a.t1d is 
nc•t t-eally supet-st.it.ious at all.; it is simply an efficient way 
of making sense of, cor1trolling, pt-e dieting.. a.nd e::·::plaining the 
behavior- of these plants in a way t.ha.t. t1icely cin:u.mvents one's 
ignm-a.nce of the contn:•lling mechanisms.23 
12 is especially needed when a system becomes too 
complex to predict its behavior in 11 terms. That is, it ' s 
fine to talk. about a robot "wanting to go outside" (12) when 
an explanation in terms of program code and electronics is 
too long or complex. 'Wanting' conveys the idea adequately. 
An alternative use of mental terms is seen in the 
programmer who starts with 12 and works his way to 11. In a 
chess program, for example, the programmer wants to mak.e the 
computer protect-the-king. The notion of protect-the-king 
must then be translated down to the 11 program code level to 
mak.e the system perform the 12 behavior. 
12 is not a property of the system, rather 12 reflects 
our stance or attitude toward the system. 2 "'• Note that 
operationalists in AI are usually operational only with 
respect to 12 and 13 and scientific realists regarding 11. 
12 has heuristic, predictive value only and has nothing to do 
with the nature of the system under investigation--man or 
machine. 11 is where real explanations are found. 
Why is operationalism important here? I mention this 
approach because operationalists use mental terms much lik.e 
Searle or a dualist would use them. For the latter two, 
however, 12 has more than just heuristic value. 12 for 
Searle says something about the system itself, not just how 
we might view it. 
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The AI debate is about whether a system 
really is intelligent or has desires. Operationalism does 
little to help answer this question, but might sound to the 
unwary reader as if it does. 
V. Epistemology and Attribution 
Some of the confusion over the Chinese Room could be 
eliminated if all the participants would maintain a 
consistent epistemic relationship to the system being 
discussed. That is, critics often alter their epistemic 
position without warning the reader. By 'epistemic position' 
CEP) I mean the relationship between an agent and a state of 
affairs whereby the agent is justified in holding certain 
beliefs about that state of affairs. 
I'm sure an example would be useful. Say I am in my 
study and I come to the belief p that my wife is doing 
cartwheels in the living room. Now I have no evidence for 
this, thus p is unjustified given my epistemic position 
(which coincidentally corresponds to my physical location). 
If however, I go into the hall and see my wife's shadow 
flipping all about and hear the crash of a lamp on the floor, 
my epistemic position has changed. I now have some justi-
fication for p. It is important to note that epistemic 
position does not affect the truth of any belief. I can be 
justified in a belief and still be wrong. This last point is 
simply the well-known distinction between truth and 
justification. 
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Let's apply EP to the Chinese Room. The Chinese people 
only have access to the IN/OUT slots of the room. Call their 
epistemic position EPl. Given the apparent replies they 
receive to their questions, those at EPl are justified in 
believing pl = 'someone inside the room understands Chinese'. 
Those in the strong-A! camp argue that we are in an 
analogous EP to those at EPl when we approach a highly 
sophisticated computer system. That is, given the system's 
semantic behavior, we are justified in believing p2 = 'the 
computer understands z' where z is the subject matter of the 
program (e.g., chess). Just like the Chinese people, we have 
behavioral evidence that the computer understands what it is 
doing. p2 might be false, but given our EP, we may rightly 
attribute intelligence to certain intricate systems. 
the argument goes. 
Or so 
Let's go back to the Chinese Room. Say one of the 
Chinese doesn't like the answer he received and takes a 
sledge hammer to the OUT slot. The window breaks revealing 
Searle with his rule book and baskets of symbols. As the 
Chinese begin to investigate, they come to realize that 
Searle doesn't understand a bit of Chinese; he's just doing 
what his rule book tells him. Now their EP has changed from 
EPl to EP2 given the new evidence. At EP2, they are no 
longer justified in believing pl. 
The key to Searle's experiment is that we are not in an 
analogous epistemic position to EPl with respect to complex 
computers. Rather, we are closer to EP2. 
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We know exactly 
what's going on inside: rule-governed symbol manipulation 
following the instructions of a well-defined computer code. 
We can get beyond the behavior of the system down to how the 
(apparent) semantic activity has been generated. 2~ 
An anticipated reply to this analysis of EP comes from 
the classic "other minds" problem in philosophy. Searle 
briefly considers this himself,z• I can't know with 
certainty that anyone else has a mind (or consciousness or 
intelligence, etc.) like I know that I have a mind. Everyone 
else could be an android controlled by Descartes' evil 
genius. From my EP, all the evidence available to me for 
believing you have a mind is your behavior. Why not use the 
same behavioral criteria for a computer? 
In reply, note that the AI criticism short-changes us 
on the available evidence. The criteria I use to infer that 
others have minds is based on our similar behavior in similar 
situations, but behavior is not the only thing we have in 
common. There are both behavioral and physical similarities 
to consider, specifically, I and other humans share a close 
neurophysiological similarity that I do not share with 
computers. This commonality is the backbone of Richard 
Swinburne's principles of charity and credulity used to deal 
with the other-minds objection (see his Evolution of the Soul 
pp. 13-17 for a detailed analysis). The problem with 
attributing a mind or intelligence to a computer is our 
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obvious lack of similarity in physiology. At present, 
neuroscience is not mature enough to say how far the notion 
of intelligence can be removed from the only paradigm case 
available: human brains. Swinburne points out that, 
It. would be diffet-et1t if •.p~e had a well-justified gener-al theor-y 
Ctf CC!t1SCiousr-JeSS " Zf " that e::·::pi.::titied which physical pt-S:tCesses 
of kir,ds O:UtTer1t.l.y u.r-,~mown give r-ise tc. which met1tal 
ever1ts. • . • Then we could e::-::amir1e the t1at-t.ian.s and 1·-obot.s to 
see whether- their- ph)!Sical pn:.cesses wen? c•f a chat-actet- to 
give dse to menteJ events, i.e. wer-e similar to our own in 
whatever- r-espects the theor-y had identified a.s cr-ucial for-
t.his"27 
In lieu of such a comprehensive mind-theory, our EP 
allows us to conclude only that beings with both behavior and 
physiology like ourselves are intelligent. In terms of the 
earlier discussion, Ix is limited to x's that are human, at 
least for the time being. 26 If behavior were all we had to 
go on to judge whether a given computer is intelligent, then 
our EP would allow for the attribution of intelligence. But 
we are not so limited. 
VI. Conclusion 
Neither Swinburne (a dualist) nor Searle (a 
physicalist) 
objects to theoretical synthetic intelligence. The point of 
the Chinese Room is that whatever form this synthetic 
intelligence takes, it will not simply instantiate formal 
rules. It must affix semantic content as well. The driving 
cognitive model of AI, the RR model, is inadequate for true 
intelligence, since it maintains that syntactic rules are 
sufficient for semantic behavior. 
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But as we have repeatedly 
seen, there is a distinct, first-person, qualitative 
difference between my understanding of, say, English, and the 
ability to act as if I understood English by following a rich 
syntactic rule book. 
The galactic brain thought-experiment and the 
discussion on epistemic position have demonstrated the 
difference between our attribution of intelligence to systems 
for heuristic purposes, and the question of whether a system 
is intelligent or not. This distinction must be kept in mind 
when reading the vast array of literature on the Chinese Room 
and AI itself. 
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29Anticipating the outcry from my theistic readers, I 
realize I have limited x so that God is likewise not a 
candidate for Ix. Please note that the predicate I is to be 
taken in a restricted sense along the lines of intelligent-
like-ourselves. God is certainly intelligent in the common 
sense of the term, but he ls not intelligent-like-ourselves. 
Thls ls clearly seen ln God's omniscience, which is something 
quite different from intelligent-like-ourselves. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE FRAME PROBLEM 
Within a genet-at.ieoti the pt-oblem of o-eB.tit19 artificial intelligence will be 
substantially solved. 
Mat-viti Mins~-;.y 
Computat.iom Fit1ite am:! It1fit1ite Machines. 1'7.167 
The AI pn:•blem is one of the hat-dest science has ever·· undertahen. 
Mat-vin MitiS~\Y 
"How Cat1 Cr:•mputet-s ()et Commor1 Sense?" 1982 
In Chapter 1 we saw how the rules-and-representations 
model of cognition used by GOFAI (good-old-fashioned-A!) 
failed to distinguish computer syntax from semantics. In 
this chapter we will examine another problem that has plagued 
GOFAI for two decades: the frame problem (hereafter FP). 
Before I say what the problem is, the reader should be 
warned about some side issues. First, there are many 
articles in print that show how some writer mistakenly 
identifies the "real" FP and then goes on to clear things up. 
Unfortunately, these articles do not always agree on what the 
real FP is. I will not try to sort out this confusion nor 
will I adopt any one writer's choice of terms. 'FP' here will 
represent the most general rubric for several related and 
over-lapping topics one of which might be called the frame 
problem proper. 
Second, the FP is related to but not the same as a 
"frame," "script," or "schemata." These terms, now common in 
the AI literature, refer to a programming strategy employed 
to help overcome the FP. This particular strategy will be 
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discussed at the end of the chapter. 
The FP is a question about the relation of propositions 
to one another. Persons, we observe, make key adjustments to 
their noetic web of propositions without being told to do so. 
All the sub-topics within the FP, to be discussed in Section 
II, relate to the digital computer's inability to either draw 
on or properly manipulate propositions the system already 
contains. 1 I will not offer a solution to the FP here. My 
goal is to demonstrate a rational ability we have that 
computers lack. This lack emphasizes the gap between man and 
machine that strong-A! claims to have bridged. 
I. Setting the Stage: Background Knowledge 
Before jumping into the subtopics that collectively 
make up the FP, I would like to introduce a related 
difficulty. This information should help the reader gain a 
foothold in the discussion. Perhaps the easiest way to 
introduce the problem of background knowledge is with my 
favorite illustration by Daniel Dennett, the man perhaps most 
responsible for bringing the FP to the attention of the AI 
community. Consider the "snack problem." 
I couldt-,'t mahe a sat1dwich without hnowit19 a gcn:uj deal--about 
br-ead, spt-eading maymmaise, opet1it19 the fhdge, the fr-iction 
at11j inet-tia that will heep U1e tw-key between the bt-ead slices 
a.nd the bt-ea.d •:.r-, the plate as I .:an-y the plate over- the table 
beside my easy cha.it-. . . . I listed a few of the ver-y many 
humdr-um facts one needs to ~mow to solve the snad'. pr-oblem, 
but I didn't mean to suggest that those facts at-e stor-ed it1 
me--ot- it1 2J"1)' a.gent--piecemeal, in the fc·t-m of a lor19 list of 
sentet1ces e>::plkit.ly decl?-rir,g each of these facts for- t.t1e 
benefit of the .:;..gent. • . • We tmow tr-illions of thit1gs; we fmow 
that mayonnaise doesn't dissolve kr·d.ves ot1 cm1tact, that a 
slice of bt-ea.d is smaller- than Mount E'·!et-est.. that opening the 
r-efr-iget-atc.t- doesn't. cause a nudeat- holoca.ust. in the 
f\i tchen. 2 
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Rational agents have the ability to form, not just call up 
from memory, the specific propositions required to solve 
everyday problems. As Dennett points out, there are many 
propositions that we "know" but do not directly consider as 
we go about our day. 
The problem of background knowledge arises due to the 
program requirements of serial computers. 3 To solve any 
problem, a computer must be given a data base of all 
propositions needed to solve that problem (i.e., the initial 
conditions) plus instructions about how these propositions 
relate. The difficulty lies in programming the computer to 
use its data base appropriately. Of course, the notion of 
'appropriate' is quite vague. Somehow we draw on our 
experience to make inferences that relate to our present 
situation. A computer must be instructed (i.e., programmed) 
to make similar right inferences--"right" being another ill-
defined notion in this context. 
One major difficulty in this project is that we are not 
sure ourselves what principles we use to learn from 
experience. Margaret Boden, a prominent AI writer-
philosopher, believes that in all human reasoning there are 
unformalized "integrative principles of tacit inference or 
global knowledge of which one is not introspectively aware." 4 
Although the nature of these principles is of great interest, 
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we do not need to fully understand how we use our experience 
to in fact make use of it. 
This pragmatic use-it-without-understanding-it approach 
is fine for humans. Nonetheless, whatever these principles 
are that we take advantage of, computers do not have them--
thus the problem. Once again, all initial conditions plus 
the principles of inference between propositions must be 
provided for the computer. Since we do not know ourselves 
how we in fact make use of experience, it is no surprise that 
formalizing this ability into computer code is a formidable 
task.. 
How past experience affects future events is of course 
not a new puzzle. The problem of induction remains unsolved 
with no solution on the horizon. The background knowledge 
problem might simply be a byproduct of the problem of 
induction, but, as Dennett rightly points out, the FP as a 
whole will remain even if induction is resolved. I will come 
back. to this later. Let's now move on to a variety of topics 
that all claim to be at least part of the FP. 
II. The Frame Problem(s) 
The FP in its broad sense is a computer's inability to 
"know" how any single piece of information affects the rest 
of a data base. Let's say for simplicity's sake that a data 
base, at a certain level of description, contains 
propositions. When a programmer inputs a new proposition, 
how does a computer determine which other propositions are 
\ 
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affected? There is currently no way to determine which 
specific propositions are to be changed without an exhaustive 
search of the data base. Such a search, however, is highly 
inefficient and not computationally practical given the time 
restraints we put on intelligence (i.e., systems that take 
days to solve simple problems are not considered candidates 
for intelligence even by strong-A!). 
To illustrate, say I have a large stack of index cards, 
with one sentence per card, that collectively explains the 
United States strategy for arms negotiations with the Soviet 
Union. Intelligence sources then report that the Soviets 
have secretly withdrawn all troops from Poland. This new 
information will require a revision in some of the sentences 
on my index cards, but how many and which ones? The only way 
to know is to look through them all. 
Dennett sees the FP not as a technical hurdle for AI, 
but a general epistemic question: How does any cognitive 
creature know which conceptual propositions need to be 
updated to keep one's internal model "roughly faithful to the 
world."~ I will of course limit the discussion to the AI 
realm and not explore the larger epistemic question. 
For the most part, this section will only present the 
difficulties for AI. How programmers do in fact circumvent 
(or at least minimize) the FP will be dealt with in Section 
I I I . Let's now examine the components of this large problem. 
A. Data Retrieval. Assuming that all the requisite 
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facts for solving a given range of questions are provided in 
a data base, how does a computer get to these facts to make 
use of them? Well-known AI critic Hubert Dreyfus explains, 
To establish that a fact e::dsts in its data banhs a. cc.mputet-
must. n?t.heve it. Wor-se .• to establish that. some fact is not iti 
the data bank r-equit-es e::·::amitiing the ent.it-e list of what the 
computer- ~mows to detennitie that 1::.t1e fact in questim1 is 
missing.6 
In contrast, Dreyfus cites Richard Shaffer's example of our 
(usually) direct access to our knowledge. 7 I know immedi-
ately when I was born and with some thought I can recall when 
my mother was born. I know immediately that I do not know 
when Thomas Jefferson was born and no amount of thinking will 
retrieve that information. I know that I do not know it. In 
a computer, only an exhaustive search can reveal the absence 
of any fact. 
If the reader does not think exhaustive searching is 
much of a hindrance, especially with the speeds at which 
modern computers operate, consider that the world's best 
chess playing system, Carnegie-Mellon's "Deep Thought," can 
calculate 750,000 positions per second. By 1992, the rate 
should exceed one billion positions per second.e For the 
system to calculate the best move in any given situation, an 
exhaustive search of all possible counter-moves and counter-
counter-moves, etc., would have to be made. However, it is 
estimated that there are 10120 different possible games of 
chess. Even if Deep Thought could calculate a billion games 
per second, an exhaustive search would take over 100 trillion 
trillion centuries. This will not do. 
Koperski 43 
How is it that the 
chess program on my PC thrashes me in much less time? 
The answer is that programmers are well aware of 
algorithms for more efficient data base searching. One such 
method is the use of heuristics. Heuristic rules are short-
cuts or rules-of-thumb that people often use in decision 
making. For example, in chess I use rules-of-thumb like 
"don't sacrifice a bishop to capture a knight." Rules like 
this are a common programming tool to help cut down 
computation time. 
There are two major problems with the heuristic 
solution. First, the approach makes the problem less 
noticeable but fails to solve it. For a data base search 
that is both accurate and fast, very specific heuristics are 
required. Such rules are often hard to specify when the data 
becomes overly large and complex. The second objection is 
more problematic: the rules don't always apply. As any 
chess player knows, sometimes you have to sacrifice the 
bishop. The second is a more formidable problem since the 
computer has no way of determining when such rule breaking is 
allowed unless there is yet another rule to tell it to do so. 
That is, the system would need second order heuristics for 
breaking first order heuristics, and so on. A point of 
diminishing returns develops such that the time spent 
searching for applicable rules sacrifices the time saved by 
employing heuristics in the first place. 
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To digress for a moment, this need for rule breaking 
points to what some call the hard/soft paradox of AI.• Some 
human reasoning appears to be rule-governed (e.g., logic, 
grammar, etc.). The computer's algorithmic ("hard") rules 
are perfectly suited to simulate such thinking. Hard rules 
cannot be violated except by the instruction of another hard 
rule. 
In everyday situations, however, we find many instances 
where rules are appropriately broken. Consider the rule "do 
not throw cold water on your wife." This rule should 
immediately be broken if my wife's hair catches fire. The 
"soft" side of human reasoning is the ability to intuit 
circumstances that call for extreme or unusual action. In 
these cases, the computer's algorithmic rules become a 
hindrance. 
I can think of few rules of behavior that persons 
should not violate under ~condition. I do not believe, 
however, that I have a ready made criteria for identifying 
the circumstances under which such rule breaking is required. 
Such decisions must often be made "on the spot." This need 
for adaptability is a notorious problem for AI. 
In sum, although programming techniques such as 
heuristic rules lessen the data retrieval problem, no method 
thus far has solved it. There appears to be a profound 
difference between men and digital computers regarding memory 
itself and the relation between memory and behavior. 
B. Relevant Facts. 
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Perhaps the key difficulty in the 
FP is determining the relevancy of facts. That is, given the 
vast number of facts available to make any single decision, 
how can a computer choose the relevant ones and ignore the 
rest? 
Consider again my stack. of index cards on arms 
negotiations. Someone asks "if the Soviets destroy half of 
their ICBM's, how many cruise missiles can we give up?" I 
would like to consider only those cards that have to do with 
cruise missiles, but I don't know which ones they are until I 
search through the whole stack. skimming for the word 
"cruise." Furthermore, there may be some cards that do not 
have "cruise" on them, but are relevant to the question. How 
do I get to these without wading through the entire stack 
again? It appears that the exhaustive search continues to be 
the only way to be sure. 
Again heuristic rules can be used to help determine 
relevancy. Consider Haugeland's theoretical computer with an 
English language data base that must determine how to 
interpret 'the pig is in the pen' . 10 'Pen' of course has 
multiple uses in English. The computer must determine if 
'pen' is a place on a farm or a writing instrument. The 
relevant fact for solving the ambiguity is that pigs cannot 
fit into a writing instrument. The problem is, how does the 
computer determine the relevant fact in this case has to do 
with size? How does the computer determine the key feature 
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in any case? 
A possible solution to the Haugeland example is that 
"in" usually has a size implication. The computer could 
solve the ambiguity with the heuristic semantic rule "a 
sentence of the form 'x is in y' implies that y is larger 
than x." The drawback to this solution is twofold. First, 
as the number of semantic rules like this one becomes large, 
the computer would need meta-semantic rules to determine 
which semantic rules are relevant. How will the computer 
know if any of these rules (semantic, meta-semantic, and so 
on) should be broken? More rules for rule breaking are 
required . Once again, heuristics push the problem back 
but do not solve it. Second, "in" is itself ambiguous in 
this context. This particular semantic rule will not work 
for the sentence "The pig is in the photograph." Other non-
heuristic methods for determining relevant fact will be 
presented in the next section. 
Before moving on, let me refer back to the problem of 
induction. Following Dennett, let's assume a computer has 
somehow overcome the problem and now has perfect inductive 
"beliefs." The computer still suffers from the FP since it 
will still have no way of prioritizing this massive array of 
beliefs about the future. Exhaustive knowledge about the 
future, based on past experience, does not insure that such 
knowledge will be used effectively. 
A walking encyclopedia will walk over- a. cliff, fm- a.ll its 
htiowledge of cliffs and t.he effect.s c•f gt-avit.y, unless it. is 
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designed it1 such a f.:tshion that it can find the t-ight bits of 
hnowledge at the r-iqht: times .• so it can plan its engagements 
with the r-eal wor-ld (empt1B.sis mine).11 
C. Selective Updating: The Bookkeeping Problem. Some 
consider the bookkeeping problem to be the key difficulty of 
the FP. Consider a data base of propositions that 
collectively form a model of, say, a desk with colored blocks 
on it: Blockworld. Let the model be output in three 
dimensional graphics so everyone can see what Blockworld 
looks like. Blockworld is set up to correspond to a group of 
real colored blocks on my desk. Thus when I turn the blue 
block on my desk on its side, I input a new proposition, p, 
to the Blockworld model, p = 'The blue block is turned on its 
side' . 
The question is, which other propositions need to be 
revised when p is added to keep the model accurate? Of 
course all of the propositions which contain 'blue block' 
might need revision and only those need be considered if the 
blue block is alone in the middle of the desk. But what if 
ten other blocks are stacked on the blue block? Now a large 
number of spatial propositions need to be revised that do not 
contain 'blue block'. 
Depending on the overall situation, some propositions 
must be updated and others left alone. Provided that causal 
interactions are all part of the model (e.g. moving blue 
block causes ten others to fall), the computer must access 
each proposition in the model to find if it needs revision. 
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But as we saw, exhaustive searches are time consuming and 
heuristics alone do not solve the problem. An efficient 
method for selectively updating only the relevant information 
is required. Of course this assumes the relevant facts 
problem has already been solved. 
Let's now look at some of the programming techniques 
used to circumvent the FP. 
III. Repairs and Solutions 
A. Repairs. To lessen the effects of the FP, some 
applications use the "cheap test." 12 The program contains 
commands that exclude irrelevant parts of the data base from 
the search. For example, in Blockworld there might be a 
limiting rule like 'when an object moves, color and size are 
not affected' . The data base could be easily organized so 
that propositions about color and size are grouped. The 
program would then "flag" these groups to exclude them from 
the search. 
Unfortunately, the cheap test is actually a kind of 
heuristic and is subject to the drawbacks mentioned earlier. 
Furthermore, such limiting rules do not always apply. If the 
objects in Blockworld are ice cubes or clay, for example, 
friction will change the shape of the blocks when they are 
moved. By now the reader should see the relationship between 
the scope of application and the proportional need for more 
(perhaps second order) rules. 
Another programming technique is the "sleeping dog" 
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approach. 13 The program is instructed to leave all 
propositions alone unless there is some positive reason to 
revise them. That is, when a new proposition is introduced, 
the program assumes that without sufficient warrant or 
computational relevance nothing else in the data base is 
affected. 
The glaring difficulty with using the sleeping dog 
approach in any general application is how to specify 
"sufficient warrant" or "computational relevance." Defining 
these terms and then encoding them for the computer ~ the 
FP! I do not mean to imply that either the cheap test or the 
sleeping dog approach are useless. They are quite sufficient 
for dealing with a variety of applications. The criticisms 
here are intended to show that neither is able to solve the 
FP for very general or complex applications. 
As Dennett has pointed out, there appears to be another 
inherent problem with all such relevancy tests. 14 The goal 
is to make the system limit its focus to only certain (i.e., 
"relevant") inferences. The two approaches mentioned add a 
relevancy axiom to cut down on the calculated inferences. 
Dennett points out, however, that in any (monotonic) 
deductive system, the addition of an axiom never reduces the 
number of inferences available, it always increases them. 
Otherwise, the new axiom must be inconsistent with a previous 
one. 
For example, consider a closed deductive system with 
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five axioms. Let's say that there are twenty proofs 
calculable from these axioms. Now add a sixth axiom. If 
Axiom 6 makes any of the previous twenty proofs invalid, it 
is inconsistent with one of the first five axioms. Say Axiom 
6 is consistent with the first five and is a relevancy test 
which is supposed to limit the number of inferences. Instead 
of limiting steps, the program will calculate all the same 
inferences (the twenty proofs) plus calculate their relevancy 
(i.e., solve the proofs that follow from the addition of 
Axiom 6, the relevancy test). 
What we really want is for the system to ignore 
irrelevant data, not calculate that the data is irrelevant 
and then ignore it. No one wants a computer to waste 
valuable computation time calculating all of the propositions 
that it can ignore. 
B. Scripts: A REAL solution? The most successful 
solution to the FP to date is the use of "scripts" (Schank), 
"frames" (Minsky), and "schemata" (Rumelhart). For those 
unfamiliar with field, the difference is negligible. The 
dissimilarity lies in the degree of a program's 
"anticipation." Here are the computer scientists' own 
explanations of this approach: 
t1im;~.;y: A ft-ame is a dat.a-st.ntct.ut-e fc·t- n:pn::1sent.ing a 
sten:ot.yped situation .• like being in a cet-t.ait·• hit1d .:.f living 
t-oom, Ot- g.:.ing to a. child's bit-t.hday p.:tr-t.y. Att.act1ed t..:. each 
fn:u1ie at-e sever-al hinds of infm-mat.ion. !::orne r:•f this 
infor-mation is about how to use the ft-ame. Some is abr:•ut what 
one can e:=·=:pect to happen ne::-=:t.. Some is about what to do if 
these e::·::pectat.ions ;:.re not confir-med. . • • t'luch of the 
phenomer·1ological pO'ol/er- of the theor-y hinges on the inclusion .:.f 
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::;chanf'.i We define a scdpt as a. pt-edetet-mined causal chait1 of 
conceptualizations t.ha.t. descdbe the r:m-mal sequence of things 
in a fa.miliar- situatiotl. Tt1us thet-e is a. t-estaw-a.nt. scr-ipt, a 
bit-thday-pat-t.y schpt, a football game scr-ipt., a dassn:u:om 
SCI·-ipt._, atld SO Oti.16 
The ability-to-ignore, lack.ing in other techniques, is not 
attained through the addition of a new IGNORE-algorithm in 
the program. Instead the system's attention is focused by 
the stereotypical expectations of the script. 
This anticipatory behavior of a script roughly 
simulates our own day-to-day interactions. When someone 
enters a familiar situation, lik.e Schank.'s football game 
script, he has certain expectations and customary actions 
that help him to socially negotiate the activity. If he 
encounters something highly unusual, say his chili-dog bursts 
into a chorus of "God Save the Queen," it tak.es time to sort 
out what's going on and what the appropriate reactions might 
be. 
Similarly a robot running scripted software has no 
difficulties within the preprogrammed expectations. That is, 
when the robot's encounters fit the script, its reactions are 
easily accessed by the program thus circumventing exhaustive 
searches, relevancy tests, etc. Abnormal encounters tak.e 
longer to deal with, not unlik.e reactions in persons. 
There are some usual questions a GOFAI critique ask.s at 
this point. The first of which usually involves 
adaptability: Does the script technique allow for a wide 
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range of applications? 17 When things proceed as usual, the 
computer's script can deal with most problems and has an 
acceptable range of adaptability. I will not defend this 
assertion except to say computer scientists would not 
continue to pursue such a research program without limited 
success. When things come "out of the blue" however, like 
the aberrant chili-dog, the computer's reactions are often 
not foreseen nor acceptable. 
A more severe problem is related to the relevancy test. 
Not only do persons determine which facts are relevant in a 
given scenario, but they also assign different degrees of 
relevancy to them. We are able to adapt to different "levels 
of weirdness" as John Searle puts it. But even scripted 
software is not able to prioritize its expectations to suit 
different situations. For example, in Schank's restaurant 
script, "it is equally 'weird' for the restaurant to be out 
of food as it is for the customer to respond by devouring the 
chef." 1 e The singing chili-dog is just as strange in the 
football script as kicking a seventy yard field goal. 
How is it that we recognize degrees of weirdness? At 
least part of the answer is that we are not isolated to facts 
within a given script; we have access to other facts about 
cultural norms and interpersonal relations. For example, a 
woman without a top walking on a beach is highly irregular 
(i.e., the situation, not the woman) in America but not in 
France. An isolated group of "beach facts" cannot be 
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assigned degrees of abnormality without knowledge of cultural 
norms. Notice how the relevancy test, degrees of relevancy, 
and background knowledge problems all come into play here. 
Given these problems with the script technique, why has 
it been such a successful research program? The answer 
ironically yields another criticism: there is an ad hoc fix 
available within each script. 1 ~ As a programmer debugs a 
given script, he usually stumbles onto the abnormalities that 
go beyond the software's ability to adapt. At these specific 
points, a direct contingency command is implanted to prevent 
the system from "locking up" or doing whatever undesired 
activity it tends to fall into when confronted with aberrant 
data. Individual scripts can always be saved in this way. 
For example, consider a simple algebraic computer 
program written in BASIC in which some variable A is used in 
several equations. One of the lines of the program is '500 
CB+C)/A'. The programmer notices that if the variable A is 
zero, then line 500 will generate an error message: division 
by zero is algebraically undefined. To circumvent this 
problem, the programmer can put in a line '490 If A=O, then 
550' which instructs the program to skip over line 500 and 
execute line 550 if A is zero. This strategy is a perfectly 
acceptable ad hoc fix for preventing division by zero, but it 
is obviously restricted to this problem. 
Unfortunately, ad hoc solutions are not sufficient to 
solve the FP in general. Scripts are a useful approach for 
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solving specific problems but this strategy cannot overcome 
the digital computer's chronic lack of adaptability. 
Scripted software was hoped to be the key to solving a 
host of GOFAI puzzles. In the early 80's it became evident 
that current scripts were not performing as expected and some 
of the strong-A! rhetoric started to be toned down. For 
example, compare Minsky's 1967 quote at the beginning of the 
chapter with this one from 1981: 
.Just cm·,st.r-u.ct.irlg a hnowledge base is a ma..jot- it",tellect.ual 
r-esean=h pr-oblem. • • • We still ~-:.r·,c·w fat- too little about the 
cc•ntents and st.t-uctur-e of common-setlse knowled;:1e. f.. 'mitlimal' 
commm1-set1se system must '~mow' something about ca.use-and-
effect, time, puq::.ose, locality, pt-ocess, a.nd types of 
~\t1owledge= = :s r. We tieed a ser-ious epist.emola:,gical t-esear-,=h 
effm-t iti this at-ea.20 
Let's assume that scripts in the future will overcome 
all the aspects of the FP mentioned so far. There appear to 
be two more problems on the horizon that affect this 
approach. 
IV. Future Hurdles 
A. The Folding Problem. Assume for the moment that 
humans work from something like scripts. As I sit here in 
the midst of my thesis-script, say I come to a sticking 
point-~! just don't know how to work out some conceptual 
problem. But I recall from my history-class-script that in 
World War II the Americans, in order to liberate others, 
initially bypassed well fortified islands held by the 
Japanese. I take the "principle" (an admittedly ill defined 
notion that I will not shore up here) of temporarily 
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bypassing difficult obstacles and apply it within my thesis-
script by moving on to the next topic. In script 
terminology, I have folded information from two unrelated 
scripts. Programming a computer to do likewise is the heart 
of the "folding problem." 
Within the limited universe of a given script, some AI 
programs adapt well to new information and can generally 
limit the crunch of the FP. Some Aiers believe that when 
enough powerful scripts are loaded into one computer, it will 
behave intelligently in all script-scenarios and therefore, 
under GOFAI, will be intelligent. 
The folding problem is simply this: computers do not 
channel general principles between isolated scripts. As my 
previous illustration shows, we are able to learn from a 
given situation and apply our knowledge to new unrelated 
settings. All inferential ties between software scripts, in 
contrast, must be determined in advance. 
Furthermore, there are also instances when whole, 
unrelated scripts need to be integrated. Assuming persons 
rely on a restaurant-script and a birthday-party-script, we 
can easily fold these two scripts together when a birthday 
party is held in a restaurant. Such smooth combinations of 
discrete scripts do not just emerge within a program. To 
solve the folding problem, programmers must find a way to tie 
together the conceptual archipelago of multiple scripts. 
B. The Jumping Problem. Closely related to the folding 
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problem, the jumping problem is the computer's inability to 
make a smooth transition between scripts. 
For example, say you are eating lunch at the Western 
Steer (i.e., are in the middle of your restaurant-script) 
when your colleague, who has illegally made his third trip to 
the one-time-only salad bar, begins choking on a tomato. You 
must immediately transition from your restaurant-script to a 
choking-script to save his life. An observing computer 
meandering through its restaurant-script has no ready made 
way of jumping to another. Inference bridges would have to 
be provided in advance between all possibly connected 
scripts--obviously demanding a great deal of foresight on the 
part of the programmer. 
Scripts are unquestionably useful within a well defined 
scenario. The folding and jumping problems show, however, 
that daily cognitive activities require interaction between 
normal, stereotypical situations. In the next section I will 
examine some criticisms directed at the FP itself. 
some claim the FP is a pseudo-problem. 
V. A Real Problem? 
That is, 
The most outspoken antagonist of the FP is Drew 
McDermott. His criticism is three-pronged. 21 First, the 
above mentioned sleeping dog method has been a sufficient 
programming technique for most of the last fifteen years. It 
is so successful, in fact, that no one in the field is even 
working on a solution to this mythical FP! Second, regarding 
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intelligence, we do not make the same demands of perfection 
on humans that the FP imposes on computers. That is, humans 
cannot take all relevant information into account when such 
facts become numerous. Information overload is a problem for 
all cognitive beings, not just computers. Third, the 
philosopher-critics ("framist") who push the FP are a moving 
target. Once Aiers begin to answer the real FP, framists 
shift to other "related" problems that are themselves able to 
be overcome. 
Patrick Hayes, in the article right after McDermott's 
in one anthology, responds to McDermott's challenge. 
The ft-ame pr-oblem is sometimes dismissed 2.s being a natTow, 
t.echnica.l pt-oblem of little pfiilosetphical inter-est. I think 
this is a. mista.he. For- one thir1g, a. 'nan-ow technical problem' 
which is this immediate., this centt-al, this devasta.ting.. and this 
t-esist.ant. to solution is wot-t.hy of some r-espect.~22 
Why isn't anyone working on the FP? Because, as I pointed 
out earlier, for each script under consideration, there is 
always an ad hoc fix that takes care of that and only that 
script. Whatever this fix may be, it generally is not 
applicable to another s.cript. 
The overload problem in McDermott's second prong is for 
the most part correct. Although he fails to consider our 
abilities to prioritize incoming information based on 
experience, McDermott rightly points out that GOFAI critics 
should not demand that a computer surpass man's cognitive 
abilities. All finite beings can consider only a finite 
number of propositions at one time and are thus subject to 
information overload. 
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McDermott's point is granted, but 
unfortunately for GOFAI, the FP is more than just a breakdown 
of information management. 
Another reason for taking the FP seriously, albeit a 
somewhat anecdotal one, is that it appears to be at the heart 
of the "conversion" of one of GOFAI's key workers, Terry 
Winograd. According to Dreyfus, Winograd now teaches 
Heidegger to his computer science students at Stanford to 
help show the difficulties of formalizing background 
knowledge and making scripts interact. 23 The point is, 
McDermott is simply wrong when he claims that computer 
scientists do not feel the tension of the FP. Winograd is 
the most visible strong-A! "defector" to date. 
VI. Conclusion 
How does this chapter support my overall case against 
strong-A!? I believe the problem helps show that human 
knowers are different from (at least digital) computers in 
kind, not simply in degree of complexity. The rational, 
human ability to make key changes to one's noetic web without 
rules or instructions on how to make such changes is not 
shared by program driven systems. The FP shows that simply 
having more powerful programs/rules does not eliminate the 
problem. This unique rational ability is evidence that men 
are more that very fast, very powerful, and very complex 
rule-governed machines. As long as this man-machine gap 
remains in place, the claims of strong-A! will retain their 
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status as optimistic exaggerations. 
To conclude, I would like to digress into epistemology 
proper for a moment. In most epistemic models, except very 
pure forms of coherence justification, philosophers realize 
that some beliefs play a more significant role in our noetic 
structure than others. These "weightier" beliefs support the 
lesser ones or at least require a greater amount of evidence 
before they may be revised. How beliefs relate to and rely 
on one another is a subject of great debate (e.g., what is it 
for one proposition to be evidence for another?). Under-
standing the nature of this relation is not required for 
persons to, in fact, hold and prioritize their beliefs. 
This lack of knowledge about knowledge will not do for 
GOFAI. Programmers must guess how inference, evidence, and 
even induction work and then go on to formalize these opaque 
notions. In this light, it is little wonder why 
philosopher's often view GOFAI claims with skepticism. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE OVERSEER PROBLEM 
nor!numE:i·-'icEd.: Any attempt t.c l~:w;or-e. thj.s is hi·::ihl> ... unsci~::ntific:: In t!·~1e t.r·u.e 
int.e11e.::t.u.~:J .::q)pr-·()a.c:h_IJ ct·le acce.lpt.:3 t.hi:; f~ict. Etnd copes :~lith it= 
cf Aut.om.::rt .. ~.:: 1'?-62 
The conceptual difficulties discussed in the last two 
chapters usually involve serial digital computers. On the 
cutting edge of computer technology lies another architecture 
that may very well overcome both the challenge of the Chinese 
Room and the Frame Problem. The programmes are often called 
connectionism, parallel distributed processing (PDP), neural 
networks, and massively parallel systems, although these 
names are not fully synonymous. There is unfortunately no 
space here to provide an adequate overview of this new 
approach, however, there are a handful of introductory 
articles available. 1 
In this chapter I will present another problem for 
strong-AI that affects both conventional computers and PDP. 
I must ask the reader to assume that what I attribute to PDP 
is correct and not open for discussion at this point. The 
purpose here is not to quibble about what PDP does or how it 
accomplishes its tasks; I will simply grant most of the 
claims made by computer scientists in this young field. I 
will then go on to show that neither digital computers nor 
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PDP's escape what I call the Overseer Problem COP). 
I. Connectionism: The New Frontier 
Recall my Blockworld illustration from Chapter 2. In 
short, the computer's program constructs an internal model of 
a room with colored blocks. The key to Blockworld is the 
software: the better the progt~am_. the better the model. In 
contrast, PDP does not use a progr-am. Instead the system is 
trained (invoking the anthropomorphic qualifier one last 
time) through examples. That is, the system develops its own 
generalizations and internal representations from particular 
examples without algorithmic instructions on how this 
representation is to be constructed. 
For example, let's say a given neural net receives 
input from a video camera that is pointed at various live 
dogs. After a large number of sample-dogs has been given to 
the net, the system will form an internal representation of a 
paradigm-dog. Once trained (not programmed) the net can 
distinguish dogs from other objects. Giving a sophisticated 
net a great deal of training should allow it to distinguish 
dogs from cats, cows, and perhaps even from statues of dogs. 
For the reader whose knowledge of computers is limited 
to the digital variety, it might be difficult at first to 
appreciate the tremendous difference between a conventional 
and a non-programmable system. The key is that no program 
means no rules; PDP rejects the RR theory of cognition. 
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e::-::plicit. i·-t.tJ.es,. l:;~c~.t.her-·.:z \~e .::tssume i:t. is the .::r.cquisitton of 
connection str-·t:::ngt.hs '::•.ihic!···! .:::.llo¥.1 a net1.::Jot·-~\~ of simple ux1it.::~ to 
PDP might offer a way around the Chinese Room since, 
without a program, there is no (prescriptive) syntax. 3 Few 
are claiming that neural nets are sophisticated enough to 
"understand" a natural language; however, the syntax-
semantics distinction that the Chinese Room relies on is 
harder to define when there is no program. As for the Frame 
Problem, PDP memory is not stored in data-bases but rather 
throughout the net (cf. holographic images). For· rea sons 
that I cannot explore here, such content-based memory makes 
the relevant facts issue much less of a problem. Whether PDP 
can solve the Frame Problem or the Chinese Room must wait for 
another time. Let's now examine the problem PDP does not 
escape. 
II. The Overseer Problem 
In short, the OP is the inability of artificial systems 
to perform independently, that is, without the prior 
assistance of an intelligent agent to set the parameters of 
the system's task and to determine when that task is to be 
considered correct or complete.~' The task-determination part 
is somewhat trivial. Humans, after all, usually design 
artifacts for the purpose of carrying out specific tasks. 
Task-completion and validation, knowing when the job is done 
correctly, is another matter. 
A. The Overseer and PDP. 
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How does PDP come to know a 
right or wrong answer? What is the "right" answer to a 
problem for a system that has just been activated, initially 
lacking any data to work with? Let's begin with a 
theoretical neural net in action. 
Consider a net designed to distinguish kinds of cars by 
color and manufacturer. First, the net must be "trained up" 
from examples of cars. To do this, the system is attached to 
a video camera in a parking lot. For training, the camera 
first must be pointed at a car and then the net makes a 
random guess of color and manufacturer. Actually, at this 
early stage the net does not have an internal representation 
of 'color' or 'manufacturer'; the guess is a true shot-in-
the-dark.. The net's trainer inputs a new signal that either 
reinforces the current internal representation, in the case 
of a correct guess, or alters the representation, in the case 
of a wrong guess. After a large number of examples and 
correction signals, the net is trained. That is, the system 
has developed a paradigm model for each color and each 
manufacturer, respectively. Now the camera can point to any 
car and the net will determine the make and color. 
The key to the OP is the role of the trainer. Of 
course, the trainer must determine the nature of the problem 
to be solved. More importantly, the trainer already has 
knowledge of what constitutes a right or wrong response from 
the neural net. From the net's point of view, as it were, 
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one answer is just as good as the next. The net has no 
objective reference for determining correct results except by 
the feedback of the trainer. 
For some readers, this analysis may be a matter of 
highlighting the obvious. If so, recall the claims of 
strong-AI, such as the opening quote of the introduction: 
"We are about to conceive of the knower as a computing 
machine." The thrust of the OP is that "the knower," if he 
is to be given equal cognitive status to human agents, must 
be able to function without an overseer to specify tasks and 
predetermine the nature of correct responses. Although I 
have found little attention given to this problem, here are a 
couple of notable quotes: 
GOFAI. 
Ou.r- licen:::;e t.o spe:~ak of these systems as .ju.dgin~3 simil.2J·~·it.y 
depe~rtd:3 upor1 t~···!e fc~c:t. t.l···~~:::y clas:stfy together- p~.:::t.t.er-ns t.l·13.t wc: 
The pi·-cb:tern 
cer-tain 
•--··--j' !t·=r t:: 
(empha.::;i:::: m:Lne):: 5 
genei·-B.liz]Yi'j in wa:;'s t.hctt. ai·~·e .:;;.ppl·-cpr-j.cft.e! t.c: a cont.e::-::t= 
des~v:::Jnet- !-:.::.ostr-icts the net. t.o -=~ pr-ed:::.;fined cl3.S:"5 of 
appr-cjpr-·tat.e r-esponse::-5.=: the 1·1et. :#ill be e::-::hibit.ir-~~::i the 
.!.. ;_ -· lT !_.rit.: 
¥=~ill t·-tot. have the common senst: that. wouJ.d en21.ble it. to .::=.dE.=.pt. 
tc ct.ht::r- c:orrte::-::t.s_; .?..:"3 r.:1 tr·u.ly humdx·! intelligence wou1::J=6 
B. The Overseer and GOFAI. The OP looms larger for 
In PDP, the system only needs to be fed "right" 
examples. Likewise in programmed digital computers, correct 
data must be input (recall the programmer's cliche "garbage 
in, garbage out"). Furthermore, the entire structure of the 
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computer's task must be defined in detail in the body of the 
pr·ogram. Right and wrong are, in a manner of speaking, in 
the eyes of the beholder--in this case the person writing the 
sofb.;are code. The OP here is quite stark. The computer 
does nothing without an overseer-programmer to define a) the 
problem, b) the nature of correct answers, and c) a detailed 
algorithm for how the problem is to be addressed. The last 
requirement, (c), makes the OP stronger for GOFAI than for 
PDP since, once again, the latter has no program. 
C. Obiection: PDP Can Overcome OP. The unique 
abilities of PDP might offer a way to overcome the OP. There 
is, the objection runs, no need for a program and therefore 
no need for a programmer-overseer. Inherent in the PDP 
architecture is a 
···./er-y simple mech.:::.nism for- e>=:t.t'"act.in~:~ r-egul2.r-ities fr·-oin -:::u·~ 
ensernble of ir·!pu.ts without the .::d.d cf sophistic:e..t.e.d 
·38t"ier-.::tliza.t.J.cn or· r-,_J:h:::·-for"·mul.~ting n1echc:.r-d.sms t.ha.t c:.:\;er-::::ee the.: 
ar-e cornpleteJy loc2-.l.~ in the sense tha.t. t!·-1ey char-,~je t.he 
cor1necti(',:;n bt=::tween one u.nit 2-.nd anot.t···!et"- en t.he bc:.s1.:3 of 
i=•e.r.:f::;.:r:=.Ol?.:!~.!:;&.:t T!··1e model thus st.a.nds .:::.s c.xt d.lter···nat.ive t() the 
vie·~· that. led.t-ning in C0'3r-dti ... /e s:::lst.~.:::m::::: :in\lOl\/es the '::.s>::plicit. 
.!..1--
=-·f!t: guida.nce of" 
Unlike a programmed computer, neural nets form 
conceptual representations apart from any guidance on how 
this formation is to be done. For example, our own 
conceptual schemes intended to represent the physical world 
rely heavily on our five senses. The distinguishing features 
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of objects are often given in terms of shape, color, size, 
texture, etc. 
In contrast, consider another theoretical neural net 
that distinguishes trees from telephone poles. This net's 
input consists of a TV camera, audio microphone, radar, and 
infrared detector. With this array of choices from which the 
net will build its paradigm-tree and paradigm-telephone-pole, 
we have no idea nor control over what "sensory" input the net 
will decide is significant. The net's determination of 
significance and its internal representation are completely 
unknown to any programmer-overseer. In Kantian terms, we do 
not know what categories the net will develop to distinguish 
the two kinds of objects. 
Anyone who fully understands the OP will see that this 
attempt to escape the problem will not do. First, an 
overseer is required to define a problem for the net to 
solve. Second, even without an algorithm for solving the 
tree-pole problem, the neural net still requires an overseer 
to say whether the output during training is right or wrong. 
Without this feedback, the net cannot build its paradigms. 
Third, the net's ability to make generalizations can only be 
exercised if it is given the correct exemplars on which to 
base its model. Three trees may be sufficient to give the 
net some prototype of 'tree,' but what if the trainer 
mistakenly inputs a bush? Then the paradigm is distorted and 
the net's performance is diminished. In this way the 
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accuracy of the net's future performance is wholly dependent 
on being properly trained, where "proper·" 1 s once aga 1 n in 
the eyes of the overseer. 
I I I. Induct ion 
At this point, I would like to demonstrate the OP in 
action. The problem of induction has stubbornly refused to 
succumb since the time of Hume and, with Goodman's help, it 
has actually intensified. Let's see how the problem of 
induction CPI) and the overseer problem jointly pose a 
conceptual snare for strong-AI. 
We want computers to make the "right" inferences based 
on experience. Then again, we hope to make similar right 
inferences. When are we justified in going from "x 13's have 
all been found to be y" to "all 13's are y" or even "it is 
probable that the next 13 I observe will be y"? How many 
observations are required? Since the PI is still unsolved, 
we can only observe that we do in fact make judgments about 
the future based on past experience. 
How does a computer solve the PI? Answer: An overseer 
works out the solution in advance. To illustrate, recall 
fr·om Chapter 2 the "script" technique in programming. 
Stereotypical situations (e.g., the restaurant script, the 
ball game script) are given to the computer as guidelines to 
operate within. However, to describe a given situation as 
"stereotypical" implies that we already know what 
regularities are to be expected in the future in such a 
scenario. 
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This simply ignores the PI, as we almost always do 
in our day-to-day routines. A scripted program is a safety 
net provided by the overseer to insure that the system makes 
the "right" inferences. 
induction. 
Thus the system never faces real 
Although things are better for PDP, the overseer is 
often presupposed in induction problems. For instance, from 
a given number of exemplars the net will establish that "all 
Trans Ams have been Pontiacs" and thus "the next Trans Am 
examined will be a Pontiac." However, if the goal of the 
training is to get the net to form this "belief," obviously 
the overseer must have been satisfied in advance that this 
be 1 i e f is true . 
I should point out that part of the power of PDP is its 
ability to make inferences and detect patterns not found by 
humans looking at the same data. For example, banks and 
insurance companies currently use neural net simulations to 
detect financial patterns that will help determine loan 
applications, etc. In some respects, neural nets are better 
at induction than we are. The reason this ability is 
insufficient to solve the OF lies in the training. For any 
net to make inferences, an overseer is still required to 
train the net with examples that the overseer already knows 
to be "correct" inductive inferences. 
To conclude the discussion on the PI, I would like to 
address a conceptual issue arising from differences in 
education. 
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One reason Aiers do not wrestle with induction 
the way philosophers do is because engineers, mathematicians, 
and computer scientists approach the subject through 
probability theory. An informal yet philosophically 
significant part of probability theory is what I will call 
the all-things-being-equal wand. 8 
To illustrate, I recall my introduction to probability 
theory in a communications class. The professor would always 
talk about the probability of a given event "all-things-
being-equal." An example would be, "The probability of this 
coin coming up heads when flipped is 0.5, all-things-being-
equal." We understood that this qualifier meant we could 
ignore the probability of a bird diving through the window 
and snatching the coin or the probability of the coin 
spontaneously decomposing. For all such instances, the 
professor would always wave the all-things-being-equal wand 
to eliminate unwanted factors. 
Returning to AI, without an overseer providing the all-
things-being-equal wand for the computer, the system has no 
way of "just knowing" what factors can legitimately be ruled 
out. Somehow all of the students in my communications class 
understood what factors were eliminated by "all-things-being-
equa 1." Unless computers can develop a similar ab i 1 it y .• the 
overseer will not fade into irrelevance. And unless the 
overseer fades into irrelevance, strong-AI claims will 
continue to be exaggerated. 
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IV. Thesis Conclusion 
There is a danger in criticizing AI that I have tried 
to avoid in this work. Too often critics point to what 
computers currently fail to do without a view toward 
advancing technology. This tactic is a trap: Picking at the 
difficult technological barriers and hardware-software 
limitations faced by AI today will inevitably backfire. 
For example, digital computers have had a longstanding 
difficulty in processing and recognizing images. Given 
sufficient computing time, most systems could be programmed 
to recognize faces; however, we have the ability to recognize 
a given face almost immediately. For years critics like 
Hubert Dreyfus have cited "elementary" perceptual mistakes 
made by computers that the average child could avoid. Today, 
computer image processing is quite advanced. Consider the 
accuracy of Tomahawk cruise missiles used in the Gulf War. 
With the help of a maturing technology in charge-coupled 
devices, many of Dreyfus' early criticisms about computer 
perception have now been met. 
Have I avoided this trap? I'm not sure. Unless 
digital computer technology gives way to PDP, the Chinese 
Room will retain its force (see note 3). The Frame Problem 
may very well be solved or at least made much less noticeable 
in time and I do not claim that it is an insurmountable 
difficulty. The Overseer Problem, however, is highly 
conceptual and will not likely fall in the wake of new 
technology. 
be it. 
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If I have left myself vulnerable to the trap, so 
What has been accomplished in this thesis? Instead of 
simply recapping my arguments from Chapters 1-3, I would lik.e 
to address strong-AI in general. The three chapters 
individually raise questions that must be answered before 
Aiers can claim that computers are intelligent. I do not 
mean that AI research should come to a stop until computer 
scientists can appease every philosophical nemesis. However, 
I do think. these concerns must be addressed before Aiers 
continue to lob conceptual bombs into metaphysics, the 
philosophy of language, and particularly the philosophy of 
mind. 
What has not been accomplished in this thesis? 
not developed criteria for intelligence that clearly 
I have 
demarcate man from machine. Such criteria would draw the 
discussion far afield and would need to consider the problem 
of other minds and perhaps Wittgenstein's private language 
argument, especially where the overseer/trainer is involved. 
My goal was the lesser task. of tightening the reins on some 
in the AI community. AI has unquestionably helped in the 
development of the necessary conditions for intelligence. 
Strong-AI claims, however, lead the reader to believe that 
computer science has already determined the sufficient 
conditions for intelligence. 
too optimistic. 
This claim, I have shown, is 
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Finally, I urge readers from all disciplines to keep 
track of their metaphors. Every advanced field of study 
incorporates rather innocent sounding words into the jargon 
of the field. In the case of computer science, words like 
'sees', 'knows', and 'memory' are used to describe computers 
because we know what such words mean when applied to people. 
We use these words metaphorically, which is perfectly fine. 
Too often the metaphor is lost. Common words with technical 
meanings start migrating between fields and then back to 
ordinary speech. It is regrettable when the man-in-the-
street becomes confused by this migration. When the scholar 
and the scientist likewise become confused, entire world-
views may hang in the balance. 
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NOTES 
~The best two articles available appear in the same 
journal. See John L. Tienson, "An Introduction to 
Connectionism," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 26, 
supplement C 1987): 1-16 and Willi am BechteL "Connectionism 
and the Philosophy of Mind: An Overview." The Southern 
Journal of Philosophy 26, supplement (1987): 17-41. 
2 David E. Rumelhart, James L. McClelland, and the PDP 
Research Group, Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations 
in the Microstructure of Cognition. Volume 1: Foundations, 
(Cambridge: MIT Press/Bradford Books, 1986), 32 
3 A prescriptive syntax, like a computer program, drives 
the system. Executing a program is synonymous with following 
a set of syntactic rules. Without a program, PDP has no 
driving, prescriptive syntax; however, its internal mechanism 
may be described syntactically. Although Searle believes the 
Chinese Room is applicable to PDP since there is a syntactic 
description available, I believe the Chinese Room fails 
unless the syntax is prescriptive. 
4 John Searle has mentioned a similar problem to OP 
called the "Homunculus Fallacy .•" but so far he has applied it 
only to digital computers. See Searle, "Is the Brain a 
Digital Computer?'' APA Proceedings 64 (November 1990): 21-37, 
especially pp. 28-29. 
"-~'Bechtel, 27. 
~"·Dr·eyfus, Hubert L. , and St uar·t E. Dreyfus, "Making a 
Mind Versus Modeling the Brain: Artificial Intelligence Back 
at Branchpoint," in The Artificial Intelligence Debate: 
False Starts, Real Foundations, ed. Stephen R. Graubard 
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), 38. 
7 James L. McClelland, David E. Rumelhart, and the PDP 
Research Group, Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations 
in the Microstructure of Cognition. Volume 2: Psychological 
and Biologi~al Models (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press/Bradford 
Books, 1986), 214. 
'"-'Cf. Daniel Dennett, "Cognitive Wheels: The Fr·ame 
Problem of AI," in Minds, Hachinr=>s, and E<..Jolution, ed. 
Christopher Hookway (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1 no ./. ' 1 ;, 1. 
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